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In the last years, Hungary recorded huge current deficits.  These results may endanger the
capacity of repayment of the outstanding debt and thus its access to international financial markets.  We
analyze how domestic credit market  conditions have affected  the current account performance.
Implementing  Granger-causality tests on time series data over  the  period 1990-1994, we find that
current  account performance was negatively affected by credit contraction.  Furthermore, using
desegregated data on credit, we are able to show that credit to small enterprises is highly significant to
explain current account performance as well as the level of unemployment.
RESUME
Au cours des dernières années, la Hongrie a enregistré d’importants déficits courants.  Ces
mauvaises performances peuvent mettre en danger la capacité de remboursement de la dette extérieure et
de là, priver le pays de l’accès aux marchés internationaux des capitaux.  Nous analysons comment les
conditions du marché domestique du crédit ont influencé les performances en termes de solde courant.
Utilisant des test de causalité de Granger sur des séries temporelles couvrant la période 1990-1994, nous
trouvons que le compte courant a été négativement influencé par la contraction du crédit.  De plus,
utilisant des données désagrégées sur le crédit, nous sommes capables de montrer que le crédit aux
petites entreprises est très significatif pour expliquer les performances du compte courant ainsi que celle
de l’emploi.
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1. INTRODUCTION
A main problem in Eastern European countries is how to conduct monetary policy.  In
the previous socialist system, money  was  mostly limited to its accounting  function.  In the
banking system, there was a separation between households and enterprises.
1   The role of
monetary policy was restricted to finance production targets.  The transition to a market economy
restores money in all its functions and is coupled with structural changes such as the creation of a
two-tiered banking system.  These changes are progressive and create severe disturbances in the
transmission mechanism of monetary policy.  The structural changes of these economies have
generated an unstable relation between money demand and output.  For instance, between the end
of 1992 and 1994, the velocity of M2 increased from 1.92 to 2.16, in Hungary.
2 
The main objective of this paper is to analyze the channels of monetary policy in
Hungary.  The implementation of monetary policy in Hungay has  been complicated by the
increasing public deficit.  As the monetary policy attempts to control the domestic credit creation,
there is a potential competition between the government and the productive sectors in obtaining
external financing.  A descriptive analysis of credit aggregates evolution underlines the presence
of this crowding-out effect.  Using econometric analysis, we show that credit aggregates have
been important in explaining the evolution of the real economy in Hungary.   
Currently, macroeconomists accept that monetary policy actions affect economic activity,
at least in the short run.  Nevertheless, there is far less agreement about exactly how monetary
policy  exerts  its  influence.  Two different, though not incompatible, channels are  usually
considered.  First, the “interest rate channel”.  According to this view, a tightening of monetary
policy leads to an increase in the overall level of interest rates which in turn affects investment
and output.  Second, the so called “credit channel”.  Two different components are present in the
credit channel.  On the one hand, there is a ”lending channel” according to which monetary policy
actions influence economic activity by affecting the flow of credit.  Monetary policy actions may
therefore affect those borrower’s that are bank dependent.  On the other hand, monetary policy
may influence borrower’s balance sheet. This is the “balance sheet channel” of the monetary
transmission mechanism.  It is based on the idea that credit market frictions may drive a wedge
between the cost of internal finance and external funds.  This wedge is inversely related to the
borrower’s  net worth.  Thus, the balance sheet channel stresses  the importance of monetary
policy with respect to the borrower’s balance sheet and its effects on the relative structure of
interest  rates.  The “credit channel” does not constitute an alternative to the monetary
transmission mechanism but amplifies interest rate effects by changes in the external finance
premium.
Establishing the quantitative significance of these components of the monetary
transmission mechanism is not an easy task.  Furthermore, their relative importance may have
changed at different points in time, according to economic and institutional conditions.
3   Using
US data, Friedman  (1983, 1988) and Bernanke  (1986), show  that credit aggregates perform
                        
1 Typically, there were two kinds of banks, one which financed enterprises and the other which collected
households savings, without direct contact between them.
2 See: NBH (1995).
3 Most of today’s discussion about monetary policy in capitalist economies is about how changes in
financial institutions and regulations have affected  the  different  components of the  monetary
transmission mechanism.3
better than monetary aggregates on predicting aggregate activity.
 4   They have interpreted these
findings as evidence for a bank credit channel.  Subsequent research, however, has shown that
credit (driven by credit demand) behaves countercyclically and testing the existence of a lending
channel based on the predictive power of credit aggregates is not a correct strategy in “normal”
periods.  Moreover, Bernanke and Blinder (1992)  find  that  two  quarters after a monetary
contraction, loans remain almost constant.
5   The ability of banks to maintain the level of loans
after a monetary  contraction leads Romer and Romer (1990,1993),  to  claim  that  monetary
tightening has a large impact on bank’s ability to lend only when open market operations are
supplemented by actions aimed directly at restricting lending.  These results have led empirical
research to focus on the “balance sheet” explanation.  For instance, Friedman and Kuttner (1992)
and Kashyap et al. (1993) using the spread between commercial papers rate and bank loans rate,
and the bank lending-commercial paper issuance ratio, as proxies for the stance of credit markets,
find that both measures have a predictive power on real activity.  This result comes from the
“balance sheet channel” since the external finance premia are negatively related to the borrower’s
financial position.  Moreover, Kashyap et al. (1994) show that financial factors beyond those
captured by interest rates play an important role in shaping the effects of monetary policy on
inventory behavior, by using data on publicly traded companies that do and do not have bonds
rating.
While  testing the existence and importance of a lending  channel by analyzing the
predictive power of credit aggregates may seem incorrect for developed and stable countries like
US and Western European countries, it is still a valid approach  when  analyzing periods of
financial disrupt or transition process in East European countries.  For instance, Bernanke and
Gertler (1995) argue that this procedure may be relevant in very special cases, such as the Great
Depression, but it is not relevant under “normal” conditions.  Analyzing the Great Depression,
Bernanke (1983) argues that monetary  factors are ”quantitatively insufficient” to explain the
length and intensity of the depression.  He states that along with the effects through the money
supply, the financial crisis of 1930-33 influenced the economy by reducing the quality of credit
intermediation.  The relevance of this channel in transition economies should be more clear once
one realizes that first, the limited development of  financial markets allows monetary authorities
to affect banks' loans through open market operations or other monetary instruments, e.g. Repo,
swaps.  Second, no perfect substitutes to banks' loans exist for most enterprises.  Finally, due to
the previous reasons the share of output, employment, and investment accounted for by bank
dependent borrowers is higher than in financial developed countries.
The role of the banking credit during transition has  been extensively debated in the
literature.  Hardy and Lahiri (1992) showed how in an overlapping-generations model with long-
term investments, the sudden withdrawal of subsidies and liberalization of prices lead to a brief
                        
4 King (1986) finds that when narrow bank credit aggregates are used, demand deposits have greater
predictive content for aggregate economic activity than credit aggregates. For a discussion of these
results see also Bernanke (1986). For a further discussion on the credit channel see Romer and Romer
(1990, 1993) and Bernanke and Blinder (1992).
5 Many arguments can be advanced to explain this result. For instance, most bank loans to business in
the US are made under loan commitment agreements. Thus, monetary authorities should expect that a
tightened monetary policy will decrease the amount of loans not under commitment, while loans under
commitment should change only as a consequence of changes in firm’s loans demand. Firm’s attempt to
finance increasing inventories early at the cycle will lead to an increase in outstanding loans.  Given that
loan commitments are  basically extended to large firms, the main part of monetary policy  will be
supported by small firms.  Furthermore, monetary contractions induce a shift in all lending away from
small to large enterprises. See Morgan (1992), Nakamura and Lang (1992) and Gertler and Gilchrist
(1993).4
consumption surge, banks runs and the premature liquidation of investment.  However, such an
outcome was generally not observable. This might be partly due to the fact that the state has
given its explicit or implicit guarantee to the state-owned banks.  In addition, the increase in
uncertainty has led the households to accumulate precautionary savings, at least during the first
years of transition.  Calvo and Kumar (1994) tried to rationalize the fall in output that occurred
in conjunction with price liberalization, by presenting a model in which enterprises are heavily
dependent on bank credit for their day-to-day operations leading to an output very sensitive to
changes in the stock of real money.  Regarding the public sector, Bofinger (1992), Kornai (1993)
and Perotti (1994) underlined that even tight monetary policies may be ineffective in limiting the
access of state-owned enterprises to liquidity as deficient capital markets allow for the expansion
of monetary substitutes in the form of trade and tax arrears and for the spread of loose financial
discipline.
The empirical analysis of the effects of credit on the real economy in the Eastern
European countries is still in its infancy.  This literature mainly focuses on the debate whether
monetary policy in these countries has been too tight and thereby has exacerbated output falls.
Borensztein et al. (1993) estimated a simple supply-demand model of industrial output
determination for Romania and Czechoslovakia.  They incorporated a shock on real bank credit
to enterprises to allow for possible liquidity constraints faced by firms over the period.  They
found that for the two countries, credit variables were not statistically significant.  Berg and
Sachs (1992) observed  that  the credit crunch hypothesis is generally inconsistent with the
concurrent rise in exports which was recorded in Poland in 1990.  However, Calvo and Coricelli
(1993) have underlined the role of credit in the output collapse in Eastern European countries.  In
their analysis, they run cross-section regressions involving 85 branches of industry in Poland.
They found that the decline in output has reflected credit contraction.  Rosati (1994) objected that
the available data does not allow to conjuncture that the fall of credit was a cause of output
contraction or rather that it was a result of financial restructuring in enterprises in favor of other
less expensive sources of funds such as inter-enterprise credits.
Our empirical analysis are based on the use of time series data and the implementation of
Granger-Causality tests.  These econometric procedures allow us to study the dynamics of the
effects of monetary policy during transition.  In line with the  results of Calvo and Coricelli
(1993), Hungarian data supports the assumption that  credit plays an important role  when
explaining economic performance.  Thus, our conclusions can be interpreted as indices in favor of
the lending channel of monetary transmission and of the presence of a crowding out effect in
Hungary during the period 1990-1994.  However, the evolution of financial markets or financial
relationships may lead to a deterioration of the capacity of this channel to be a good indicator of
the stance of monetary policy and to be informative about real activity.
The paper is organized as follows: in section 2 a brief summary of the macroeconomic
context is presented.  Section 3 deals with data and methodology.  Results are presented in section
4.  Section 5 concludes.
                        5
2. Monetary policy and economic performance
In Hungary, like in other  Eastern European countries, four striking economic
developments were coupled with the transition to market-based system.
8   First, the reforms
required by the transition delivered a negative shock to the economy causing a huge decrease in
output as illustrated by Table 1.  At the same time, a private sector emerged, especially in the
service  sectors  which were quasi  nonexistent under the previous regime.  However, this
emergence did not completely balance the contraction of the industrial sector where the state-
owned  enterprises  were  concentrated.  Therefore, the decline in economic activity and the
transformation of the productive structures caused a sharp increase in recorded unemployment
which reached more than 12% of the active population at the end of 1992, in a country where
unemployment was virtually unknown before the start of the reforms.












1988 -  0.1   0.0 15.5 -1.4 -  807
1989    0.7   0.3 17.0 -1.4 -1437
1990 -  3.5   2.5 28.9  0.5    127
1991 -11.9   8.0 35.0 -2.2    267
1992 -  3.0 12.3 23.0 -5.6    324
1993 -  0.8 12.1 22.5 -6.4 -3455
1994    2.0 10.4 18.8 -8.2 -3911
*: annual average
Source: NBH, 1995.
Second, the liberalization of prices led to a strong acceleration of inflation at the end of
1990 and during the first semester of 1991 even though the price jump was smaller than in other
Eastern European countries such as Poland or the Czech Republic.  Inflation, on a yearly basis,
reached its peak in 1991 as illustrated by Table 1.  Since 1992, the rate of price increases has
clearly slowed down but nevertheless, inflation remains at a relatively high level.
Third, the current account has recorded a sharp deterioration since the end of 1992.  The
main cause of this deterioration was the drop in exports, causing a huge  trade deficit.  The
current account imbalance was partly financed by foreign direct investment and partly by the
increase in foreign indebtedness of the country.
Fourth, the transition process has also been associated with an increasing disequilibrium
in public finances.  The economic recession and the structural changes have caused a decline in
the state revenues while the increase in unemployment and other social benefits, led to a continued
growth in public expenditures.  Moreover, in recent years, and especially in 1994, the state has
again increased direct subsidies far from the original targets in order to sustain economic activity.
The increasing public deficit is particularly important for the credit distribution in the
economy.  Indeed, since 1990, domestic credits to public entities, local and national government,
has increased rapidly.  In contrast, domestic credit to enterprises has not kept pace and actually
                        
8 See Calvo and Kumar (1994).6
fell even in nominal terms in 1992 and 1993
9 .  As a consequence of this evolution, the share of
the state in domestic credit has increased and represents since 1992, more than half of credit
granted.  This public credit expansion might be explained by various factors both on the demand
and supply side.  High real interest rates and the recession could have restrained the demand for
credit by the private sector.  However, between 1990 and 1994, the corporate sector has sharply
increased its foreign borrowing.  The gross debt of this sector has increased from US$ 1230
million  (HUF 77.7 billion) in 1990 to US$ 3693 million  (HUF 386.8  billion) at the end of
1994
10 .  At the same time, the public sector, confronted with an increasing deficit and less
monetary financing possibilities, had to fall back on national savings.  On the supply-side, banks
could have been willing to improve the quality of their assets by reducing their riskier activities,
i.e. the lending to the business sector.  This willingness could have been reinforced by two new
laws enacted at the beginning of 1992, which tightened strongly the financial regulation.  The new
banking law imposed to banks the same provisions as those applied in OECD countries and the
new bankruptcy law altered radically the previous regime by forcing the debtor himself to declare
bankruptcy even in the absence of strong pressure from creditors
11 .  The same reasons might
explain the dramatic increase in the interest spread, defined as the difference between the interest
rate paid on loans and the interest rate received for deposit, recorded during 1992 and the high
level maintained in the following years.
12 
Thus,  the  transition process in Hungary has  been coupled with the development of
macroeconomic imbalances and with deep modifications in the credit allocation.  The analysis of
the potential link between these elements is important for economic policy, and especially, for
monetary policy.  During the period, monetary authorities announced as their ultimate objectives,
the maintenance of the solvency of the country through the control of the current account balance,
and the control of the inflation.  The weight given to these two objectives changed over time.  The
equilibrium of the current account was designed as the first priority of the monetary policy in
1990, 1991, while the reduction of the extremely high current account deficit to an extent that
would stop the further growth of external debt was the main objective in 1994.  The control of the
inflation had the priority in 1992 and 1993.
                        
9 Moreover, as a consequence of the new Bankruptcy law of 1992, this drop was accompanied by a
drastic reduction of interenterprise credits. This source of finance, mostly used by large enterprises, had
grown from almost negligible values up to HUF 240 billion or 13% of domestic credit, at the beginning
of 1992.
10 Furthermore, from being net creditor, US$ 1312 million (HUF 82.9 billion) at the end of 1990, the
corporate sector became a net debtor with a net debt amounting to US$ 2362 million (HUF 247.4 billion)
at the end of 1994. See NBH (1995).
11 This mandatory self-declared bankruptcy provision was removed in July 1993.
12 In a less than perfectly competitive banking system, banks build up provisions by increasing their
mark-up.7
Table 2: Evolution of the gross debt of general government at the end of the year, HUF billion
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Loans from the NBH  776.4  837.2  815.6  779.8  741.2
Government  bonds financing
the deficit
  13.0   26.3  149.5  319.4  465.2
Treasury bills   10.2   60.0  157.2  220.6  314.3
Budgetary debt financing the
deficit
 799.6  923.5 1122.3 1319.8 1520.7
Other government bonds   28.1   30.0  159.8  442.7  552.9
Debts of the Social Security
Funds,  the  extrabudgetary
funds and local governments
  27.6   28.6   26.3   45.1   70.9
Domestic  state  debt of
general government
 855.3  982.1 1308.4 1807.6 2144.5
   - in % of GDP 40.9 39.7 45.3 51.1 49.8
Source: NBH, 1994 and 1995.
The financing of the public deficit is an important factor influencing the implementation
of the monetary policy.  In order to disrupt the previous practice of monetary financing of the
government deficit, the Act LX of December 1991 provided a limit to the financing of the budget
by the NBH in percentage of annual budgetary income: 5% in 1993, 4% in 1994 and only 3% as
soon as 1995.  The implication of these changes in the government deficit financing are illustrated
by Table 2.  It clearly shows the increasing share of government securities issues (lines 2 and 3)
in the financing of gross public debt.  Government  securities increased from 2.9% of the
budgetary debt financing the deficit in 1990 to 51.3% in 1994.  However, in 1993, the act was
amended by the budgetary law to increase the 1994 limit from 4% to more than 6% of the
revenue of the central budget.  In addition, until the ceiling on the growth of the government loan
stock is reached, the central bank is obliged to underwrite government papers to be issued for the
central budget.  In 1993, almost all of the government deficit was financed through seigniorage:
the consolidated government deficit amounted to more than 7% of GDP and seigniorage
appropriated to the government came to 6.3% of GDP as underlined by Hochreiter et al. (1995).
Furthermore, in 1994, the total lending (direct lending plus securities holding) to government by
the central bank amounted to HUF 1118.7 billion or 52.2% of domestic state debt of general
government.  Therefore, the government continues to force a central bank assistance when the
market conditions become difficult creating perturbation in the conduct of the monetary policy
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The previous figure illustrates the evolution of domestic credit and its  components,
deflated by the producer price index.  As we can see, the overall tightness of monetary policy is
reflected in the fact that domestic credit has contracted in real terms during 1991-1992.  When we
analyze the evolution of the different components, it appears that the credit contraction mainly hit
the medium and large firms.  Small enterprise credits grew substantially from very low levels
initially.  In 1993  and  1994,  domestic  credit recorded a strong growth.  However, it was
essentially due to the increase in credit to households and government, credit to medium and large
enterprises increasing only  slightly.  The public deficit financing seems to have created a
crowding-out effect of the productive sector.
The previous descriptive analysis tends to show that the development of macroeconomic
inbalances in Hungary is not independent  from the amount and distribution of credit.  The
objective of the next section is to test whether  this relation is statistically significant.  More
precisely, we test whether the credit market conditions have an informative content for the
evolution of economic activity.
3. Data and methodology
To empirically evaluate the role of monetary authorities’ intermediate objectives (money
or credit or interest rates), we focus not just on whether this intermediate targets help to explain
the evolution of the final objectives of monetary policy but on whether they are able to explain
fluctuations that are not already predicted by the final objectives themselves or other relevant9
variables available.
13  As long as an information content exists, monetary authorities can exploit
it.
The tests are based on autoregressive equations of the following form:
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where  Δyyy tt t =− −1, Δxxx tt t =− −1, and αβ , i, γ i and λ are parameters to be estimated.
ut−1 is the error correction term, defined as uy x tt t −− − =− 11 1 δ .  In the absence of cointegration,
this term disappears from the equation.
We can rewrite equation (1) as
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This form allows us to test the significance of the sum of the estimated coefficients of the
financial variables through the t-statistic on γ() 1 .  In the absence of cointegration, financial
variables are defined as neutral if this sum is not statistically different from zero.
The data used in the empirical analysis are monthly and non-seasonally adjusted.  They
cover the period December 1990 to December 1994.
14   A detailed description of data can be
found in the appendix. The test statistics presented in Table 4 to 10, are the p-values
corresponding to F-statistics for the null hypothesis that all the coefficients associated with the
lags of the financial variable, x, and λ, are zero.  The optimal lags of dependent and explanatory
variables have been chosen using the Schwartz Bayesian information criteria, with a maximum of
6 lags.
15   Seasonal dummies were included.
                        
13 This is a traditional approach on evaluating the role of monetary authorities’ intermediate objectives ,
e.g., Sims (1972), Friedman (1988), Stock and Watson (1989) and Friedman and Kuttner (1992).
14 We have performed Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron tests on the variables.  Testing the properties of
the data generation process of each series, we have not consider the hypothesis where the null is a
segment trend stationary variable.  One main argument is, again, the reduced size of our sample and the
difficulty of distinguishing  difference  stationary series and trend segmented series, even in larger
samples.  Over the sample period, all variables except for unemployment, are best represented by I(1)
process.  Thus, to achieve stationarity these variables have been differenced once.  Unemployment has
been differenced twice.  This atypical characteristic of the series is due to the structural break occuring
during the studied period.  Results are presented in Appendix 2.  See Stock and Watson (1989), for a
discussion of the effects of using different techniques to detrend series that possibly contain unit roots in
Granger-causality tests.
15 Because of the size of the sample and to avoid a low estimation precision we have restricted ourselves
to 6 lags.10
Note that results are conditional to the information set considered.  This limitation may
be more important than in a structural model  where  estimations  are driving by a theoretical
model.  Because of data availability and the limit of our sample size, the information set has been
limited to only two variables.  Thus our results should be interpreted not as the existence of a
causal relationship but as the existence of an informational content of the explanatory variable on
the dependent one.
4. Results
To assess the importance of the different components of the monetary transmission
mechanisms, we have started by analyzing the current account.  The sharp deterioration of the
current account since the end of 1992, is mainly due to a rapid decrease in exports causing a huge
trade deficit as illustrated by Table 3.  This drop in the exports is not due to a proportional
deterioration in the terms of trade.  The terms of trade indicators were indeed approximately
stable in 1992 and improved in 1993  and 1994
16 .  The deterioration of external trade
performances is therefore more due to a volume  effect.  Hungarian enterprises have faced
difficulties in maintaining or increasing the level of their sales on external markets. In 1993 and
1994, in comparison with Poland, the Czech and the Slovak Republics, Hungary lost market
shares in Western Europe.
17 
Table 3: Balance of payments of Hungary in convertible currencies (in US$ millions)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Exports 6346 9258 10028  8094  7613
Imports 5998 9069 10076 11340 11248
Trade balance  348  189     -48 -3247 -3635
Current account  127  267    324 -3455 -3911
Source: NBH, 1995.
From a monetary policy point of view the question is: did the domestic credit conditions
play a role in these bad external performances?  In order to assess the role of credit, we have
tested whether credit Granger caused current account.  First, we measured credit as total
domestic credit (DC), which aggregates credit to government, state and private enterprises and
households.  Second, we considered narrower measures of credit.  On one hand, we split domestic
credit into credit to the government and households and credit to the business sector: the total
credit to enterprises (CET).  On the other hand, in order to specify more accurately the role of
credit, we split CET into credit to enterprises (CLE) including  both  private and state-owned
enterprises, and credit to small enterprises (CSE) which are private.  The current lack of data
makes a precise distinction between credits to state-owned enterprises and credits to private
enterprises, impossible.  The selected data is taken both in nominal and in real terms.  Because
the important divergences observed in the evolution of the consumer price index and the producer
price index, we have calculated real data by using both indexes.
Finally, we considered the importance of the “interest rate” and the  “balance  sheet”
channels by introducing the lending rate to the business sector and the spread between the interest
                        
16 However, this observation has to be qualified by the potential effect of the modification of the structure
of the exports on the terms of trade index.
17 See OECD (1995).11
rate on loans and the one on deposits to the business sector, respectively.  These two variables
have been used in nominal and in real terms.  To obtain the real interest rates, the nominal interest
rates have been deflated using a moving average of the consumer price index over twelve months.
Before estimating the Granger-causality tests, we have checked for the existence of a
cointegration relationship.  As we have not found any cointegration among variables, we have
estimated equation (2) without the error-correction term.
The results of the regression of the current account on alternative credit aggregates, on
interest rates and on spreads, are presented in Table 4.  During the period, the increase in the
domestic credit has not had a significant impact on the current account performances.  A more
detailed analysis shows us that the two components of domestic credit have opposite effects.  On
the one hand, the increase in credit to government and households worsens the current account.
This might be due to either a demand side effect or by a crowding-out effect.  On the other hand,
an increase in credit to enterprises, both in nominal and real terms, improves the results of current
account.  Therefore, the increase in the share of government and households credit at the expense
of credit to enterprises and the reduction of real credit are two of the factors causing the sharp
deterioration of the current account performance.
The relation between interest rate, in nominal, and the current account is significative.
However, the sign of this relation is not significantly different of zero.  This means that there is
no long run effect of this variable on the current account.  Therefore, interest rate is neutral.
Finally, if the “balance sheet” channel’s assumption that the spread is representative of
the market conditions, is correct, thus the hardening of credit conditions corresponding to an
increase in the spread, leads to a deterioration of the current account.  This effect reinforces the
results of credit aggregates.  We have found that the spread is significant in explaining the current
account.  However, it has no long term effect on the current account.12
Table 4: Dependent variable: current account, optimal lag: 1
18 
Explanatory variables Optimal lag P-value of F Sign of γ() 1 P-value
Nominal variables
Domestic Credit 4 0.02 - 0.42
Non-Enterprises Credit 4 0.00 - 0.04
Credit Enterprises: Total 4 0.00 + 0.06
Credit Large Enterprises 4 0.01 + 0.08
Credit Small Enterprises 2 0.04 + 0.01
Real variables
- deflated by CPI
Domestic Credit n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
Non-Enterprises Credit 4 0.00 - 0.04
Credit Enterprises: Total 4 0.01 + 0.12
Credit Large Enterprises 4 0.02 + 0.15
Credit Small Enterprises 4 0.01 + 0.24
- deflated by PPI
Domestic Credit n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
Non-Enterprises Credit 4 0.01 - 0.20
Credit Enterprises: Total 4 0.00 + 0.05
Credit Large Enterprises 4 0.00 + 0.05
Credit Small Enterprises 4 0.02 + 0.20
Lending Rate 6 0.00 + 0.11
Spread 6 0.01 - 0.19
Real Lending Rate n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
Real Spread 6 0.01 - 0.18
We have further disaggregated the current account into imports and exports.  The results
are given in Table 5 and 6.  While, there is generally a significant effect of credit to enterprises
aggregates on imports, the sum of the coefficients is not significantly different of 0, which means
that credit variability is neutral.
                        
18 Results are generally not modified when optimal lags are chosen simultaneously for the dependent and
explanatory variables (see Appendix 3). The only exception concerns the Granger causality tests between
explanatory variables and unemployment. One of the reasons of this modification could be the presence
of a structural break in unemployment data corresponding to the tightening of eligibility criteria at the
beginning of 1993.13
Table 5 : Dependent variable: Imports broadly defined, optimal lags: 5
Explanatory variables Optimal lag P-value of F Sign of γ() 1 P-value
Nominal variables
Domestic Credit 1 0.99 + 0.99
Non-Enterprises Credit 1 0.64 + 0.63
Credit Enterprises: Total 3 0.01 + 0.85
Credit Large Enterprises 3 0.01 + 0.71
Credit Small Enterprises 3 0.05 - 0.85
Real variables
- deflated by CPI
Domestic Credit 1 0.30 - 0.30
Non-Enterprises Credit 1 0.90 - 0.90
Credit Enterprises: Total 3 0.03 - 0.78
Credit Large Enterprises 3 0.03 - 0.90
Credit Small Enterprises 3 0.07 - 0.65
- deflated by PPI
Domestic Credit n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
Non-Enterprises Credit 1 0.56 + 0.55
Credit Enterprises: Total 3 0.06 - 0.88
Credit Large Enterprises 3 0.06 - 0.99
Credit Small Enterprises 3 0.06 - 0.81
Lending Rate 1 0.77 - 0.77
Spread 2 0.06 + 0.04
Real Lending Rate 4 0.03 - 0.10
Real Spread 2 0.09 + 0.07
These results on the current account are confirmed when examining exports.  Table 6
shows  that  credit to non-enterprises, in nominal and real terms, is generally  significant and
negative.  An increase in the credit to non-enterprises leads to a deterioration of exports,
supporting the crowding-out explanation. Furthermore, credit to enterprises is significant and
positive.  One of the logical links between credit and exports might be the following: a decrease in
credit leads to a decrease in output by strengthening firms’ budgetary constraint.  Under the
assumption of a constant “exports/total output” ratio, this will lead to a decrease in exports.  If
we allow this ratio to change, for instance, if a decrease in credit goes together with a reallocation
of production from domestic to external markets,  the effect previously described would be
mitigated.  In order to have a more precise description of the relationship between  credit to
enterprises and the current account, a set of data on enterprises split according to the main market
they serve (domestic or foreign markets) and according to the type of ownership, private or
public, would be needed.  This kind of information is currently not largely published.  However, a
study by Ivan Major (1995) on the balance sheet and on fiscal declaration of Hungarian
enterprises between 1988 and 1993 indicates that private enterprises with foreign participation
had,  during  the  whole  period, the highest exports/turnover ratio,  followed by state-owned
enterprises  which  had a ratio higher  than  domestic  private enterprises.  Yet, the external
performances of domestic private enterprises improved and the gap to state-owned enterprises
had constantly declined.  Moreover, if private firms are more efficient than  state-owned
enterprises, then even if the latters have a higher export/output ratio, a credit reallocation from
private firms to state-owned ones may decrease total export.  It is thus useful to consider the
relation  between  credit to enterprises and industrial production, taken as an indicator of the
general level of economic activity.14
Table 6: Dependent variable: Exports broadly defined, optimal lags: 2
Explanatory variables Optimal lag P-value of F Sign of γ() 1 P-value
Nominal variables
Domestic Credit 1 0.31 - 0.31
Non-Enterprises Credit 1 0.04 - 0.03
Credit Enterprises: Total 1 0.02 + 0.02
Credit Large Enterprises 1 0.03 + 0.03
Credit Small Enterprises 1 0.03 + 0.03
Real variables
- deflated by CPI
Domestic Credit 1 0.28 - 0.27
Non-Enterprises Credit 1 0.02 - 0.02
Credit Enterprises: Total 1 0.10 + 0.10
Credit Large Enterprises 1 0.14 + 0.13
Credit Small Enterprises 1 0.05 + 0.05
- deflated by PPI
Domestic Credit 1 0.47 + 0.47
Non-Enterprises Credit 1 0.28 - 0.28
Credit Enterprises: Total 1 0.01 + 0.00
Credit Large Enterprises 1 0.01 + 0.01
Credit Small Enterprises 1 0.01 + 0.01
Lending Rate 4 0.00 + 0.01
Spread 3 0.00 - 0.62
Real Lending Rate 1 0.44 + 0.44
Real Spread 3 0.00 - 0.51
Granger causality tests have not shown any significant relation between  any of the
financial variables and industrial production.  One possible explanation relies on the fact that
large enterprises have heavily called on foreign credit and inter-enterprise credit which are not
taken into account in our  credit measures.  Unfortunately, these  data are not available.
Furthermore,  the  current  statistical  coverage of the industrial production is not yet able to
accurately measure the evolution of industrial output in Hungary, like in other Eastern European
countries.  Real activity is likely  underestimated by this statistic which  covers  mainly the
production of large enterprises and has great difficulties in incorporating the newly-emerging
dynamic  private sector.
19   In addition, a decrease in credit might also be coupled with a
reallocation of output at the expense of the service sector.  This can explain that exports of goods
and services decrease while industrial production does not change.  A better indicator of the
general level of activity would be the GDP, but unfortunately, it is only available on a yearly
basis.
 20   In order to capture the effect of financial variables on the general level of activity, we
have turned to the level of unemployment.  We do not consider unemployment as a proxy of
industrial production but as another measure of economic activity which should be relevant to
policy makers.
21 
                        
19 See, for example, Berg (1993).
20 Using the industrial production index to obtain monthly estimations of GDP is not a solution in the
context of a country in transition as structural changes modify  the  relative weight of industry and
services in the GDP.
21 The  divergences  between  the  two  indicators is partly due to the  evolution of labor productivity.
Following decline in 1990-1991, productivity in the Hungarian industrial sector recorded a modest
growth in 1992 and improved rapidly since 1993, with an annual increase of 15 percent.15
As illustrated by Table 7, there is generally no significant relation between credit to
enterprises and the level of unemployment, except  when  credit is deflated by the PPI.
Nevertheless, when we decompose credit according to the size of enterprises, we find that credit
to small enterprises has a significant negative effect on the unemployment level.  A decrease in
bank financing to the small enterprises leads to a destruction of jobs and thus to a growth in
unemployment.  This result is reinforced by the negative relation between the real spread and
unemployment.  The lack of relation between credit to large enterprises and unemployment might
be due to the restructuring process started since the beginning of the transition.  The increasing
share of credit to small enterprises in the total credit to enterprises, during the period, reduced the
effect of this restructuring process.
22 
Credit to government and households has a positive effect on unemployment, i.e. an
increase in this kind of credit increases the unemployment level.  One of possible explanation of
this effect might be the crowding out effect of government  financing,  which  particularly hits
enterprises which depend on the domestic banking system.
Table 7: Dependent variable: unemployment, optimal lags: 5
Explanatory variables Optimal lag P-value of F Sign of γ() 1 P-value
Nominal variables
Domestic Credit 2 0.03 + 0.01
Non-Enterprises Credit 1 0.02 + 0.01
Credit Enterprises: Total 1 0.23 - 0.22
Credit Large Enterprises 1 0.42 - 0.42
Credit Small Enterprises 1 0.00 - 0.00
Real variables
- deflated by CPI
Domestic Credit 1 0.25 + 0.25
Non-Enterprises Credit 1 0.03 + 0.03
Credit Enterprises: Total 1 0.17 - 0.17
Credit Large Enterprises 1 0.29 - 0.29
Credit Small Enterprises 1 0.00 - 0.00
- deflated by PPI
Domestic Credit 2 0.06 + 0.08
Non-Enterprises Credit 2 0.05 + 0.01
Credit Enterprises: Total 1 0.06 - 0.06
Credit Large Enterprises 1 0.13 - 0.12
Credit Small Enterprises 1 0.00 - 0.00
Lending Rate 1 0.79 - 0.79
Spread 1 0.05 - 0.04
Real Lending Rate 1 0.71 - 0.71
Real Spread 2 0.04 - 0.01
Despite the lack of detailed data,  the  causality  tests  have undoubtedly showed the
importance of the credit to enterprises when explaining the external performance of Hungary,
even if it is not necessary the only explanatory variable.  This observation is particularly
interesting in a context where the huge budget deficit constrains monetary authorities to maintain
their restrictive policy by imposing the burden to the enterprises sector.  Moreover, the results
                        
22 Lending to small enterprises has also been promoted by two public interventions: the creation of the
fund for the guarantee of loans to small and medium enterprises and the preferential interest rate E loans
designed to help the start of small enterprises.16
have underlined the importance of credits to small enterprises for the evolution of current account
as well as for the decrease in the level of unemployment.  These small enterprises are particularly
dependent on domestic bank financing as they are unable to directly borrow neither from the
domestic markets nor from foreign ones.  During the period covered, commercial banks have been
progressively less reluctant to finance these enterprises, leading to an increase in the share of the
credit to these small enterprises in the total credit to the business sector.  This can be due to the
fact that lenders become more experienced with credit evaluation and as time goes on, small
enterprises with good track records, could benefit from a “reputation effect”, thus easing a firm’s
access to credit.  Moreover, as noted by the OECD (1995), enterprises’ income  statements
improved in 1993 and 1994, and especially those of export-oriented enterprises.  This credit
reorientation could have softened the effect of credit contraction on the current account and on the
level of general activity.
We have further analyzed the effects of finance variables on inflation.  Indeed, the control
of inflation is the other ultimate objective of monetary authorities.  During the whole period, price
stability was difficult to maintain given the deep transformations implemented.  The liberalization
of prices, which was already partially achieved, reached, at the end of the period, more than 90%
of prices, weighted by the share in the consumer price index.  The VAT system which was
introduced in 1988-1989 was extended to a wide range of goods and the rates of VAT were
unified  and increased.  Public  tariffs  were progressively increased.  The majority of the
liberalization measures implemented during the period had a direct or an indirect impact on the
consumer price index.  As a consequence, inflation strongly accelerated at the end of 1990 and
during the first semester of 1991 even though Hungary never experimented hyperinflation like in
Poland.  Since 1992, price increases have been less frequent.  However, inflation remains at a
high level, maintaining the necessity to curb it.
As shown in Tables 9 and 10, we find  that  tight monetary policy reduces inflation.
Moreover, we do not find a significant relation between prices and any credit aggregate.  The
positive effect of the spread on inflation might be explained by a hardening of credit market
conditions.
23   The dramatic increase in the interest spread recorded in 1992 and the high level
maintained in the following years could find its roots in the enactment of the New Banking Act in
1992 which required banks to reach the Cooke ratio at the end of the year.  As a consequence of
this tightening of the legislation, banks have restrained their riskier activities by lending to the
state rather than to enterprises.  Furthermore, they have tried to increase the profitability of new
operations by decreasing the interest rate on deposits more rapidly than they do on new loans.  All
enterprises were thus confronted to a decrease in banking financing and under the assumption of
supply-constraint, this could lead to an acceleration of inflation.  Another plausible explanation
for this result might be found in the countercyclical behavior of the mark-up.  During a recession,
firms have lower cash flow and greater difficulty raising external funds.  Therefore, to increase
current profits in order to meet their liabilities and finance investment, they increase their mark-
up.
24 
                        
23 Results of a survey on the impediments to production in Hungary presented by Kopint-Datorg and
quoted by Kornai (1995), show  that the main impediments are insufficient demand and  financing
problems. OECD (1993), pp. 111, noted that the private entrepreneurs mentioned credit access as their
main constraint.
24 For the countercyclical behavior of mark-ups and capital market imperfections, see Chevalier and
Scharfstein (1993).17
Table 9: Dependent variable: Consumer price index, optimal lags: 6
Explanatory variables Optimal lag P-value of F Sign of γ() 1 P-value
Lending Rate 1 0.01 - 0.01
Spread 6 0.04 + 0.01
Real Lending Rate 1 0.14 - 0.13
Real Spread 6 0.03 + 0.01
As illustrated by Table 10,  the producer price index is also  influenced by the real
effective exchange rate which did not significantly affect the CPI.  However, the sign of the
relation is not significantly different from zero.  The central bank has maintained, during the
whole period, the stability of this real effective exchange rate as an operative objective of the
monetary policy.  It achieved this objective in 1990 and 1992 but a real appreciation took place in
1991 and 1993.  During these two years, nominal depreciations of the Forint were insufficient to
compensate the increase in the inflation differential.
Table 10: Dependent variable: Producer price index, optimal lags: 1
Explanatory variables Optimal lag P-value of F Sign of γ() 1 P-value
Real effective exchange
rate
6 0.01 - 0.78
Spread 6 0.00 + 0.02
Real Spread 6 0.01 + 0.03
Real Lending Rate 6 0.01 - 0.11
5. Conclusions
As we have discussed above, the amount and the structure of credit is relevant to explain
Hungarian economic performance.  These results are in line with those obtained by Calvo and
Coricelli (1993).  While they were interested in the links between credit and output performance
in a point in time, we have addressed the question in a dynamic setup.  Using time series data
over the period 1990-1994, we find that the lending channel has been an active channel of the
monetary transmission mechanism.  Credit has been a driving force in economic activity.  These
results  could  come  from the fact that during the period, firms have been mostly supply-
constrained in credit markets.
We find that  the  current account performance was  negatively  affected by the credit
contraction.  Using disaggregated data on credit, we are able to show  that  credit to small
enterprises is highly significant to explain current account as well as the level of unemployment.
This highly significance does not mean that credit to small enterprises explains all the variations
of the current account and the level of unemployment.  Moreover, given the limited size of the
sample, the regressions’ results give only qualitative inferences but cannot be taken as precise
measures of the impact of credit on real activity.  Therefore, the fact that these variables have an
information content on the evolution of economic activity does not imply that they can be used as
instruments of monetary policy.  Starting  using  them as instrument leads estimates’ results
subject to the Lucas’ critics.18
These  results reinforce  our inference  that firms, at least the small ones, are  supply-
constrained.  Indeed, small enterprises have no other external financial source than bank loans.
Thus, the distinction between different credit aggregates seems to be very important in order to
explain the evolution of the current account and economic  activity, through the level of
unemployment.  To go further in this analysis, panel data with firms split according to their size
and the markets they serve should be used.  The effects of credit contraction on unemployment
have been mitigated by the reallocation of credit.  Credit to small enterprises increased from 3.8%
of total credit to enterprises in 1990 to 10.2% in 1994.
Finally, we did not find a significant relation between credit aggregates and inflation,
measured by the CPI or the PPI.  In contrast, a restrictive monetary policy leads to a decrease in
inflation.  Moreover, using the spread between lending rates and deposit rates, as a proxy of the
stance of credit markets, we show that increases in this spread, that is a tight credit market, has a
positive impact on inflation.19
Appendix 1
The data are published by the National Bank of Hungary in its monthly and annual reports. The
description of data is the following:
DC: domestic credit stock including credit to enterprises, households and government,
CET: total credit to enterprises both private and state-owned,
CLE: credit to large enterprises ,
CSE: credit to small enterprises,
CG: credit to government and households,
RCDC: real domestic credit, deflated by the consumer price index,
RCCET: real total credit to enterprises, deflated by the consumer price index,
RCCLE: real credit to large enterprises, deflated by the consumer price index,
RCCSE: real credit to small enterprises, deflated by the consumer price index,
RCCG: real credit to government and households, deflated by the consumer price index,
RPDC: real domestic credit, deflated by the producer price index,
RPCET: real total credit to enterprises, deflated by the producer price index,
RPCLE: real credit to large enterprises, deflated by the producer price index,
RPCSE: real credit to small enterprises, deflated by the producer price index,
RPCG: real credit to government and households, deflated by the producer price index,
LR: lending rate defined as the weighted average of individual contracts concluded in the current month
by the commercial banks and specialized financial institutions with enterprises and entrepreneurs under
market conditions for loans maturing within one year,
SPD: interest spread defined as the difference between the interest paid on loans maturing within one
year and the interest received on deposits fixed for less than one year, by the business sector,
RCLR: real lending rate, deflated by a moving average of consumer price index,
RCSPD: real interest spread, deflated by a moving average of consumer price index,
REER: real effective exchange rate as calculated by the National Bank of Hungary,
CA: current account in convertible currencies, in millions of US$,
IMPE: extended imports, measured as imports of goods and services plus expenditures from tourism,
and expenditures from interest and financial investments,
EXPE: extended exports, measured as exports of good and services plus revenues from tourism, revenues
from interests and financial investments and balance of unrequited transfers,
IP: industrial production index,
U: number of registered unemployed people,
CPI: consumer price index,
PPI: producer price index.20
Appendix 2: Unit root tests
Dickey-Fuller Phillips-Perron
Variable C,T Lag C Lag - Lag C,T Lag C Lag - Lag
CA 0.92 4 0.80 4 0.02 4 0.38 4
ΔCA 0.12 3 0.03 3 0.00 3 0.00 3 0.00 3 0.00 3
DC 0.78 2 0.99 2 0.95 2 0.98 2
ΔDC 0.54 2 0.30 2 0.48 6 0.01 2 0.00 2 0.00 6
CLE 0.96 2 0.96 2 0.98 2 0.93 2
ΔCLE 0.21 2 0.08 2 0.00 2 0.00 2 0.00 2 0.00 2
CSE 0.31 5 0.16 5 0.91 5 0.72 5
ΔCSE 0.64 4 0.48 4 0.07 4 0.01 4 0.00 4 0.00 4
CET 0.94 2 0.93 2 0.94 2 0.89 2
ΔCET 0.28 2 0.09 2 0.00 2 0.00 2 0.00 2 0.00 2
IP 0.24 6 0.71 4 0.75 6 0.38 4
ΔIP 0.27 3 0.10 3 0.00 3 0.00 3 0.00 3 0.00 3
U 0.07 6 0.81 6 0.97 6 0.45 6
ΔU 0.95 4 0.16 6 0.00 5 0.01 4 0.54 6 0.05 5
Δ
2U 0.02 6 0.06 5 0.00 5 0.00 6 0.00 5 0.00 5
REER 0.67 3 0.50 3 0.70 3 0.58 3
ΔREER 0.25 2 0.07 2 0.00 2 0.03 2 0.00 2 0.00 2
CPI 0.91 6 0.82 6 0.59 6 0.95 6
ΔCPI 0.55 6 0.25 6 0.39 5 0.02 6 0.00 6 0.00 5
PPI 0.57 6 0.96 6 0.58 6 0.96 6
ΔPPI 0.58 6 0.25 6 0.57 6 0.00 6 0.00 6 0.00 6
SPD 0.95 2 0.30 6 0.99 2 0.65 6
ΔSPD 0.16 2 0.28 3 0.00 2 0.00 2 0.00 3 0.00 2
LR 0.96 3 0.62 3 0.99 3 0.83 3
ΔLR 0.58 2 0.35 2 0.02 2 0.22 2 0.06 2 0.00 2
RCDC 0.92 4 0.76 4 0.88 4 0.70 4
ΔRCDC 0.28 6 0.11 3 0.00 2 0.03 6 0.00 3 0.00 2
RCCE 0.92 2 0.80 2 0.96 2 0.93 2
ΔRCCLE 0.24 2 0.08 2 0.00 2 0.00 2 0.00 2 0.00 2
RCCSE 0.28 5 0.59 5 0.90 5 0.66 5
ΔRCCSE 0.24 2 0.08 2 0.00 2 0.00 2 0.00 2 0.00 2
RCCET 0.89 2 0.86 2 0.94 2 0.94 2
ΔRCCET 0.30 2 0.09 2 0.00 2 0.00 2 0.00 2 0.00 2
RSPD 0.97 2 0.39 6 0.99 2 0.71 6
ΔRSPD 0.11 2 0.33 3 0.0 2 0.00 2 0.00 3 0.00 2
RLR 0.05 6 0.65 2 0.50 6 0.74 2
ΔRLR 0.39 6 0.11 6 0.00 2 0.00 6 0.00 6 0.00 2
RPDC 0.88 2 0.80 2 0.93 2 0.83 2
ΔRPDC 0.26 2 0.07 2 0.00 2 0.00 2 0.00 2 0.00 2
RPCLE 0.87 6 0.81 2 0.90 6 0.92 2
ΔRPCLE 0.31 2 0.10 2 0.00 2 0.00 2 0.00 2 0.00 2
RPCSE 0.27 5 0.03 5 0.91 5 0.41 5
ΔRPCSE 0.65 4 0.50 4 0.03 4 0.01 4 0.00 4 0.00 4
RPCET 0.90 2 0.85 2 0.93 2 0.92 2
ΔRPCET 0.36 2 0.12 2 0.00 2 0.00 2 0.00 2 0.00 2
Figures under the heading C,T are the p-value of the DF and Phillips Perron statistic for the null
hypothesis of unit root when the model is estimated with constant and trend.  The figures under the
heading C correspond to the model estimated with constant but without trend. The 5th and 10th column
correspond to the model estimated without constant and trend.21





P-value of F Sign of the
sum of coef.
P-value
DC 2 3 0.01 - 0.31
CET 1 4 0.00 + 0.06
CLE 2 3 0.00 + 0.08
CSE 2 3 0.03 + 0.19
CG 1 4 0.00 - 0.04
RCDC 2 1 0.10 - 0.09
RCCET 1 4 0.01 + 0.12
RCLE 1 4 0.02 + 0.15
RCCSE 2 3 0.01 + 0.25
RCCG 1 4 0.00 - 0.04
RPDC 1 0 n.s. n.s. n.s.
RPCET 1 4 0.00 + 0.05
RPCLE 1 4 0.00 + 0.05
RPCSE 2 3 0.03 + 0.21
RPCG 2 3 0.00 - 0.09
LR 2 5 0.00 + 0.01
SPD 2 3 0.01 - 0.06
RCLR 2 1 0.07 + 0.06





P-value of F Sign of the
sum of coef.
P-value
DC 1 3 0.36 - 0.94
CET 5 3 0.01 + 0.85
CLE 5 3 0.01 + 0.71
CSE 5 3 0.05 - 0.85
CG 1 3 0.54 - 0.93
RCDC 1 3 0.81 - 0.84
RCCET 5 3 0.03 - 0.78
RCLE 5 3 0.03 - 0.90
RCCSE 5 3 0.07 - 0.65
RCCG 1 3 0.79 - 0.90
RPDC 3 0 n.s. n.s. n.s.
RPCET 5 3 0.06 - 0.88
RPCLE 5 3 0.06 - 0.99
RPCSE 5 3 0.06 - 0.82
RPCG 2 0 n.s.  n.s. n.s.
LR 1 3 0.64 + 0.66
SPD 5 2 0.06 + 0.04
RCLR 5 4 0.03 - 0.10





P-value of F Sign of the
sum of coef.
P-value
DC 0 4 0.37 - 0.58
CET 2 1 0.02 + 0.02
CLE 2 1 0.03 + 0.03
CSE 2 1 0.03 + 0.03
CG 2 1 0.04 - 0.03
RCDC 0 4 0.36 - 0.35
RCCET 2 1 0.10 + 0.10
RCLE 0 4 0.40 + 0.59
RCCSE 2 1 0.05 + 0.05
RCCG 2 1 0.02 - 0.02
RPDC 0 4 0.58 - 0.96
RPCET 2 1 0.01 + 0.00
RPCLE 2 1 0.01 + 0.01
RPCSE 2 1 0.01 + 0.01
RPCG 0 4 0.71 - 0.55
LR 2 4 0.00 + 0.01
SPD 2 3 0.00 - 0.62
RCLR 0 4 0.18 + 0.34
RCSPD 2 3 0.00 - 0.5124
The optimal lag for the unemployment variable and explanatory variable is zero for all tested relations
expect those presented in the following table:
Optimal lag U Optimal lag
indep. var.
P-value of F Sign of the
sum of coef.
P-value
CSE 0 2 0.00 - 0.31
CG 0 1 0.06 + 0.06
RCCSE 0 2 0.00 - 0.17
RPDC 0 2 0.06 + 0.24
RPCET 0 1 0.04 - 0.04
RPCLE 0 1 0.08 - 0.08





P-value of F Sign of the
sum of coef.
P-value
SPD 6 6 0.04 + 0.01
LR 6 1 0.01 - 0.01
RCSPD 6 6 0.03 + 0.01





P-value of F Sign of the
sum of coef.
P-value
SPD 5 3 0.00 + 0.06
LR 5 1 0.06 - 0.05
RCSPD 5 3 0.00 + 0.08
RCLR 5 6 0.01 - 0.12
REER 4 6 0.00 - 0.1425
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